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Abstract.  How can we understand the complex nexus of interpersonal relationships from a 
phenomenological, experiential standpoint? Drawing on theory and research from R. D. 
Laing’s interpersonal phenomenology, social psychology, and Interpersonal Psychotherapy, 
this paper examines the disjunctions that may arise in people’s perceptions of each other, and 
the highly destructive consequences that such disjunctions can have. It explores the questions 
of how people perceive, and misperceive, other people’s experiences; how people perceive, 
and misperceive, others’ perceptions of their experiences (‘metaperceptions’); and the 
implications that such an analysis has for the practice of person-centered and experiential 
psychotherapy and counseling.  
 
Keywords: interpersonal perception, metaperception, person-centered therapy, process-
experiential therapy, interpersonal phenomenology 
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The Inter-Experiential Field: 
Perceptions and Metaperceptions in Person-Centered and Experiential Psychotherapy  
In recent years, several theorists and practitioners within the person-centered and 
experiential field have worked on developing our understanding of interpersonal processes 
and how an individual’s psychological difficulties may be related to problematic modes of 
inter-relating. Foremost amongst these is Germain Lietaer (e.g., Lietaer, 2001; van Kessel 
and Lietaer, 1998), whose model of psychological distress is based on the premise that ‘there 
is a mutual link between a person’s psychological problems and complaints…and his/her 
specific approach to others around him/her’ (van Kessel and Lietaer, 1998, p.159). Like many 
theorists in the field of interpersonal psychotherapy (e.g. Safran and Muran, 2000; Stolorow, 
Brandchaft and Atwood, 1987), Lietaer argues that individuals with psychological difficulties 
often have rigid and inflexible ways of relating to others; and that therapists, by refusing to 
get hooked in to these patterns of relating in the therapeutic context, can help clients develop 
more flexible and functional modes of interacting. Within the person-centered and 
experiential field, there have also been recent attempts to develop ways of working with 
couples and families (Gaylin, 2001; Johnson, 1996; O'Leary, 1999). Johnson’s ‘Emotionally 
Focused Therapy’ for couples, which again starts from the assumption that psychological 
difficulties are related to highly rigid interaction patterns, has proven to be particularly 
popular, with demonstrably positive treatment outcomes. More recently, there have also been 
moves within the person-centered field to re-orientate the approach around a more 
intersubjective, dialogical understanding of human being (Mearns and Cooper, in press; 
Schmid, 2002), in which the establishment of a therapist-client encounter at a level of 
‘relational depth’ (Mearns, 1997, 2003) serves as the lynchpin of the therapeutic work. 
 Such developments are an important means of bringing person-centered and 
experiential therapies into line with current advances in the philosophical and 
psychotherapeutic fields, where one-person, individualistic psychologies are increasingly 
being replaced by two-person, intersubjective understandings (see Crossley, 1996). As with 
other two-person approaches, however, there is a danger that, in moving away from a one-
person psychology, the person-centered and experiential field will also move away from an 
understanding of human being at the level of phenomenological lived-experiences. An 
important contemporary challenge for the person-centered and experiential field, then, is to 
find a way of understanding human inter-relating in all its complexity and irreducibility, 
without losing sight of the actual lived-experiences that have always been at the heart of a 
person-centered and experiential analysis. 
 The current paper, then, is an attempt to develop such an understanding and its 
implications for the practice of person-centered and experiential therapy. Much of its 
inspiration comes from the work of the radical Scottish psychiatrist, R. D. Laing (see Cooper, 
2003). Following in the footsteps of such existential and phenomenological psychiatrists as 
Jaspers (1963) and Binswanger (1963), Laing (1965) attempted to develop a 
phenomenological account of schizophrenia, and in doing so he focused on the kinds of 
misunderstandings, double-binds and deceptions that may arise in schizoid-predisposed 
interpersonal encounters. In some of his later writings (e.g., Laing, 1970; Laing, Phillipson 
and Lee, 1966), Laing extended this analysis beyond the schizophrenic experience, and the 
notion of ‘metaperceptions’ that he developed with Phillipson and Lee will serve as a key 
conceptual tool in the present analysis.  
 
INTERPERSONAL PERCEPTION 
How does one person perceive another person’s experiences and to what extent are 
those perceptions likely to be accurate? As both Rogers (1951) and Laing (1969) have 
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argued, such perceptions are likely only ever to be partial and incomplete, and a number of 
reasons for this can be cited. Most basically, as Laing argues, one person cannot have direct 
awareness of another person’s experiences of their world: ‘He cannot see through the other’s 
eyes and cannot hear through the other’s ears’ (1969, p.28). Closely related to this is the fact 
that each human being will experience numerous phenomena – such as thoughts, feelings, 
needs and intentions – that are forever retained at the private level. Hence, in attempting to 
understand how another person experiences their world, an observer is limited to making 
inferences from the few experiences that are publicly expressed, such as behaviors, expressed 
emotions, or verbal and nonverbal communications. What makes such inferences even more 
unreliable is the fact that an observer will only ever experience another person in a limited 
range of situations. Added to all this is the fact that a person’s public acts are likely to be 
heavily mediated by self-presentation concerns and strategies (Goffman, 1971). In summary, 
then, we can say that people’s perception of others' experiences are always likely to be 
inaccurate to some degree, and that that inaccuracy is generally going to be in the direction of 
others’ self-presentation. 
 Such a hypothesis is strongly supported by findings in the social psychological field. 
Research into the ‘perceptual salience’ phenomenon, for instance, demonstrates that 
observers’ attributions for why others behave in the ways that they do are heavily dependent 
on the information that is most focal to the observers’ attention at that particular point in time 
(e.g., Storms, 1973). Thus, for instance, if we see someone behaving socially at a party, the 
fact that they may have told us that they experience major anxieties in such settings may not 
be sufficient to off-set our perception of them as confident and extroverted. Developing this 
hypothesis further, Aronson (1999) suggests that the perceptual salience phenomena is part of 
a larger anchoring and adjustment ‘heuristic’ (a mental shortcut), whereby we take things at 
face value, and only subsequently adjust our assessment away from this anchor. And because 
we may be reluctant to revise our assessments too radically, our initial impression of 
something can be overly-determinant in how we subsequently perceive it (an obvious 
example of this being stereotyping). In interpersonal terms, then, this means that the first 
impression we have of another person – which is likely to be heavily influenced by self-
presentation concerns – will tend to serve as an anchor, around which we may subsequently 
modify our perceptions, but from which we may not be willing to stray too far. 
 This is not to suggest that a deep, empathic understanding of others is not possible, or 
to deny human beings’ ability to intuitively sense how another feels behind their public 
façade. Indeed, from research in the developmental psychology field (e.g., Beebe, Sorter, 
Rustin and Knoblauch, 2003; Cooper, 2001), it seems evident that human beings have an 
instinctual ability to empathize, and engage with, others. Yet if this were the whole story, it 
would become impossible to understand how such violent failures of empathy and 
understanding may come about between two persons. Hence, whilst we can say that human 
beings do have a capacity to deeply empathize with others, this is clearly not the most 
common state of affairs; and the more people attempt to take mental shortcuts in 
understanding others, the more they are likely to misperceive how another is experiencing. 
 It seems likely, then, that disparities will frequently arise between the way in which an 
individual experiences their world, and the way in which observers perceive them as 
experiencing it; and, along the lines of Interpersonal Psychotherapy (Stuart and Robertson, 
2003; Sullivan, 1953; Weissman, Markowitz and Klerman, 2000) and Laingian (1969) 
theorizing, it can be hypothesized that such ‘disjunctions’ may be the source of many 
psychological difficulties. Let us take the example, for instance, of an unemployed woman in 
her twenties, Jackie, who is on the verge of a relationship with an older businesswoman, Jill. 
Jackie feels intimidated by Jill’s status and achievements, and does not believe that Jill could 
really want to go out with a ‘non-achiever’ like her. Afraid that Jill will reject her if she asks 
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her out for another date, Jackie consistently vacillates about telephoning her. Jill, meanwhile, 
has no awareness of Jackie’s insecurities. What she experiences is the fact that Jackie has yet 
to ring her up, and also the youthful confidence and charm that Jackie seems to exude in 
social settings. Jill has some inkling that, perhaps, there is more to Jackie than Jackie lets on 
but, with little real evidence to back this up, Jill’s primary source for understanding Jackie is 
the way Jackie acts. And what she sees here is a confident, laid back, attractive woman who 
does not seem interested in making contact with her (perhaps it is because she is ‘over the 
hill’). So when Jackie does finally summon the courage to send Jill a text message saying 
‘Hi’, Jill reads this as an expression of sympathy rather than as a genuine desire to make 
contact and, angered, ignores it. This, then, confirms Jackie’s fear that she will be rejected by 
Jill, and both women withdraw from what could have been a potentially rewarding romance. 
 This example illustrates a further point about the relationships between two people’s 
experiential fields – one also emphasized by Johnson (1996). When we start to enter the inter-
experiential nexus, we find dynamics that are not of a unidirectional, linear nature; but of a 
bidirectional, interdependent and reciprocal kind. That is, it is not simply the case that 
Jackie’s perceptions of Jill’s experiential field affects Jackie’s experiential field. Rather, 
Jackie’s perceptions of Jill’s experiential field affects Jackie’s experiential field, and then, 
through Jackie’s behavior, affect Jill’s experiential field, which, in turn, through Jill’s 
behavior, then affects Jackie’s experiential field, et cetera. In other words, processes within 
the inter-experiential nexus are much closer to the kinds of feedback loops that contemporary 
chaos and complexity theorists have outlined (e.g.,  Chamberlain and Bütz, 1998) – with all 
their unpredictability, responsiveness to minor changes, and oscillation around equilibria – 
than the atomistic, cause-and-effect relationships of a Newtonian universe. In clinical terms, 
then, the issue is less about the specific effect that one particular interpersonal perception 
may have, and more about the kinds of vicious circles and spirals that two or more people 
may descend in to. 
 So how might therapy help people to untangle – and, ideally, avoid – such 
interpersonal entanglements? Perhaps the most obvious answer to this question is that if 
people can be helped to be more transparent, direct and assertive in their communications 
with others, then the possibility of interpersonal entanglements should be attenuated (see also 
van Kessel and Lietaer, 1998, who argue that psychological difficulties are related to an 
incongruent style of communicating). In this respect, it could be argued that person-centered 
and experiential therapies are uniquely placed to help clients overcome such difficulties. 
Through creating a relationship in which clients can talk about any aspect of their experiential 
field without being criticized or judged, and through modeling congruent and transparent 
ways of being, person-centered and experiential therapists may maximize the extent to which 
clients can develop their capacity to communicate congruently. Indeed, whilst the benefits of 
the person-centered and experiential therapies are often articulated in intrapersonal terms – 
for instance, increasing trust in one’s organism (Rogers, 1961) or a reduction in maladaptive 
emotional schemes (Greenberg, Korman and Paivio, 2002) – their real value may lie as much 
on the interpersonal plane. Such an argument is supported by a recent finding that the primary 
area of differential effectiveness between process-experiential therapy and cognitive-
behavioral therapy was in the interpersonal domain, with clients who had undertaken process-
experiential therapy ‘significantly less domineering and controlling, overly accommodating, 
self-sacrificing, and intrusive and needy and…more self-assertive than CBT clients’ (Watson, 
Gordon, Stermac, Kalogerakos and Steckley, 2003, p.779). 
 From the analysis and evidence presented here, it could also be argued that, in certain 
instances, specifically encouraging clients to reflect on their levels of transparency and 
assertiveness may be of particular therapeutic benefit. In my own work, for instance, a major 
turning point was reached with a client when I asked him whether he had actually told his 
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wife about the high levels of stress he was experiencing at work, and which he believed were 
behind his outbursts of anger towards her. He said he hadn’t, decided that he would try it, 
and, once he did, found that this simple act brought about a major transformation in the 
quality of their relationship.  
 Based on the earlier analysis, however, it should be noted that developing one’s 
ability to be more honest with others is only one means of interrupting, or avoiding, these 
vicious interpersonal spirals. Certainly, if Jackie had been more honest with Jill about feeling 
intimidated by her, Jill might have understood Jackie’s lack of contact in a more sympathetic 
light; but if Jill had been directly able to perceive Jackie’s experiential world in a more 
accurate manner, then a similar result might have come about. This suggests, then, that it 
might also be particularly helpful for person-centered and experiential therapists to invite 
their clients to reflect on the ways in which they perceive others’ experiential fields. At the 
more non-directive end of the spectrum, this might simply involve reflecting back to clients 
how they seem to perceive others’ experiences. At the more process-guiding end, however, it 
might also involve such strategies as directly inviting clients to reflect on how they imagine 
others to experience their world, inviting clients to role play others, encouraging clients to 
actively check out their interpersonal perceptions with the people involved, or even exploring 
with clients some of the socio-cognitive biases that may emerge in interpersonal perception. 
 From a person-centered and experiential perspective, helping clients to reflect on, and 
revise, their perceptions of others’ experiential worlds may be particularly important given 
that, as social psychologists have demonstrated (Festinger, 1954), individuals’ conceptions of 
themselves tends to be highly relative to their perceptions of others. In a classic social 
psychological study, for instance, participants who filled in a job application form next to a 
pristine ‘Mr. Clean’ experienced reductions in feelings of self-esteem, whilst those who 
completed the application form next to a disheveled ‘Mr. Dirty’ experienced increases in their 
sense of self-worth (Morse and Gergen, 1970). The more, then, that an individual perceives 
others in terms of how they present themselves – a presentation which is likely to mask 
socially undesirable feelings of vulnerability, insecurity and incompetency – the more that 
they may be likely to perceive themselves as relatively vulnerable, insecure and incompetent. 
Indeed, one might go so far as to suggest that there are two basic routes to developing a 
positive sense of self-worth: one is to realize one’s own strengths and capacities, and the 
other is to realize how vulnerable and incompetent so many other people feel inside!  
 In terms of therapeutic practice, this means that it also may be particularly helpful for 
therapists to help clients explore possible fantasies and assumptions about how other people 
experience their world: for instance, that everyone else is happy, fulfilled, and feeling good. 
Indeed, along the lines of Farber (2000) and Spinelli (2001), it may be of particular value for 
therapists to disclose to clients their own vulnerabilities and difficulties, such that clients’ 
assessments of their own relative worth may be substantially enhanced. For a client to 
discover, for instance, that their therapist also sometimes gets depressed, or feels worthless, 
or experiences panic attacks, may substantially attenuates the secondary feelings of shame or 
inferiority that may have constellated around these primary emotions.  
 
METAPERCEPTIONS 
If Jackie was more able to communicate her feelings of being intimidated to Jill, or if 
Jill was more able to perceive these feelings, then the interpersonal difficulties outlined above 
might have been avoided. Based on this analysis, however, there is a further way in which 
such an interpersonal tangle may have been overcome: if Jackie had been more aware of how 
Jill perceived her. In other words, if Jackie knew that Jill perceived her as laid back and 
sociable, then this might have helped Jackie respond more constructively to the situation: for 
instance, by making an extra effort to tell Jill about her anxieties, or by being aware that Jill’s 
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non-responsiveness to her text message was an expression of anger and not of disinterest. In 
other words, failing to accurately perceive how others perceive us – what Laing (1966) 
referred to as ‘metaperceptions’ – may be as problematic as failing to express to others what 
we are actually experiencing, or inaccurately perceiving the experiences of others. 
 In attempting to explain why Jackie fails to accurately perceive how Jill perceives her, 
a number of earlier points can be re-stated. First, Jackie cannot directly experience Jill’s 
experiences (even if they are of her); second, many of Jill’s experiences of Jackie will remain 
at a private level; third, Jill’s public actions are likely to be heavily mediated by self-
presentation concerns (in particular, she may be keen to mask those feelings of vulnerability 
or rejection that she has in response to Jackie’s perceived arrogance). Given such factors, 
then, it should come as no surprise that people’s perceptions of how others perceive them 
tend to be very weakly correlated with those others’ actual perceptions (see reviews of the 
empirical evidence by Kenny and Depaulo, 1993; Shrauger and Schoeneman, 1979), and this 
is particularly the case for people who have low self-esteem (Langer and Wurf, 1999) or high 
social anxiety (Depaulo, Hoover, Webb, Kenny and Oliver, 1987; Pozo, Carver, Wellens and 
Scheier, 1991). Indeed, correlations between metaperceptions and others’ actual perceptions 
are frequently of a non-significant nature, and nearly always less than .20 (Depaulo et al., 
1987; Kenny and Depaulo, 1993; Malloy and Janowski, 1992; Shrauger and Schoeneman, 
1979). More specifically, what the research has demonstrated is that, whilst people do seem 
to have some insight into how others, in general, tend to perceive them (e.g., ‘Most people 
see me as fairly intelligent’), they have ‘just a tiny glimmer of insight into how they are 
uniquely viewed by particular other people’ (Kenny and Depaulo, 1993, pp.151, italics 
added). Put slightly differently, people tend to vastly overestimate the homogeneity in how 
they are seen by others: assuming that most people see them in relatively similar ways when, 
in fact, others’ perceptions of them often vary greatly (Kenny and Depaulo, 1993). 
 From the social psychological research, one key reason why this would seem to be the 
case is that ‘people’s beliefs about how others view them are based primarily on their 
perceptions of themselves’ (Kenny and Depaulo, 1993, p.154). In other words, people tend to 
assume that others see them as they see themselves, rather than moving beyond their own 
self-perception to consider alternative perspectives. In a summary of the research evidence, 
for instance, Kenny and DePaulo (1993) found correlations of between .47 and .70 between 
self-perceptions and metaperceptions at the individual level; and, at the generalized level, 
between .51 and 1.00. Such is the tendency for metaperceptions to correlate with self-
perceptions, as opposed to others’ actual perceptions, that this pattern has even been found in 
cultures where communication is considered to be relatively direct (Shechtman and Kenny, 
1994), and under conditions in which feedback from others in entirely unambiguous (Langer 
and Wurf, 1999).  
 A number of explanations can be put forward in attempting to account for this 
phenomenon. Perhaps the most straightforward, returning to the impact of perceptual 
salience, is that human beings are so aware of their own subjective experiences that they tend 
to assume that others must be aware of these experiences too. Here, then, is an assumption 
that the self is transparent (Depaulo et al., 1987): that others are able to read their minds. 
Such an explanation is similar to the well-documented ‘false consensus bias’ (Ross, Greene 
and House, 1977), whereby people have a ‘tendency to perceive one’s own values or opinions 
as more common and more widespread than they really are’ (Tuohy and Wrennall, 1995, 
p.323). It may also be that people simply underestimate how influenced others are by their 
self-presentations again, perhaps, because their public selves are so peripheral to their actual, 
lived-awareness. From a person-centered perspective, however, an alternative argument 
might be that people have a strong desire to maintain a consistent self-concept (Lecky, 1945; 
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Rogers, 1959), such that, to acknowledge the diverse ways in which they are experienced by 
other people could be quite unsettling – even fragmenting – to their own sense of self.  
 As the example of Jackie and Jill suggests, the assumption that others see us as we see 
ourselves can be a significant source of psychological problems. Indeed, cognitive 
psychotherapists see the assumption of self-transparency as a key cognitive distortion 
associated with avoidant and paranoid personality types (Reinecke and Freeman, 2003, 
p.233); and Interpersonal Psychotherapists consider it a common factor in marital disputes 
(Stuart and Robertson, 2003).  
 To a great extent, the reason that this assumption of self-transparency is so associated 
with psychological difficulties is because of the interpersonal misunderstandings and 
miscommunications and entanglements it evokes. A man, for instance, feels deeply ashamed 
about being infertile, and simply can not understand why his partner ‘insists’ on trying to talk 
about adoption: ‘Why is she constantly trying to rub it in!’ In this instance, one person 
assumes that the other person knows what they are experiencing, such that behaviors which 
may be simply uninformed or neglectful are experienced as deliberately insensitive, 
disrespectful or malicious. And, of course, because the person they are interacting with may 
also be making the same errors and inferences, the possibility of interpersonal entanglements 
and knots becomes immense. Moreover, the kind of inter-experiential process outlined here 
can lead to the reinforcement of problematic ways of seeing the self. An individual, for 
instance, believes that he is worthless, assumes that others see him in this way, and 
subsequently comes to believe this about himself to an even greater degree.  
 Of all the metaperceptual inaccuracies that exist, perhaps the most prevalent – and 
most damaging – is the belief that others can see our vulnerabilities, weaknesses and 
insecurities more than they actually do. As the evidence demonstrates, this is clearly the case 
for people with low self-esteem, and even people with high self-esteem tend to underestimate 
the competency that they are afforded by others (Campbell and Fehr, 1990). In my clinical 
experience, I have also come across this metaperceptual misperception numerous times – 
possibly with every client I have worked with – and, combined with the assumption that 
others are more confident and capable than they actually are, may be a major source of 
psychological distress: if not the major source. In other words, clients often have a vivid, 
powerful awareness of their own insecurities; and because they can not see these in others, 
feel relatively weak and inadequate, as well as isolated and ashamed. Furthermore, because 
they assume that these others can see in to their own insecurities, they then have fears of 
being rejected, excluded, persecuted or ridiculed by others. Of course, as discussed earlier, 
these others may also be experiencing exactly the same things, and what makes this cycle 
particularly vicious and pervasive is the fact that so many people compensate for these 
feelings of vulnerability by putting on a more invulnerable social persona, which then 
heightens the others’ feelings of relative inadequacy, ad nauseum. In this respect, 
interpersonal relationships can be likened to an escalating series of bluff and counter-bluff in 
a poker game, in which each player senses a worthlessness in their own hand, fears others can 
see it too, and consequently raises the stakes higher and higher in an attempt to convince 
others – and themselves – of their worth.  
 What, then, are the implications of this metaperceptual analysis for the practice of 
person-centered and experiential therapy? At the most basic level, it invites therapists to be 
mindful of the kinds of metaperceptions that clients may hold towards others in their world, 
and the possibility of inviting clients to explore these assumptions, much as they might invite 
clients to explore other aspects of their experiential field. Of particular therapeutic value, 
however, may be an invitation to clients to explore their metaperceptions towards the 
therapist. This can be a key point of therapeutic leverage – particularly where the client’s 
metaperception is completely at odds with the therapist’s actual perception – because the 
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therapist is able to directly inform the client as to how he or she sees him or her, providing 
the client with invaluable feedback as to how they are experienced by another, and the 
accuracy of their metaperceptions. In particular, if, as argued above, people tend to 
underestimate the worth they are afforded by others, and if the therapist holds an attitude of 
acceptance and affirmation towards the client, then clients may come to see that they are 
actually valued by others much more than they expect. Consequently, they may come to 
relate to others in a more trusting, and less defensive way, and thereby start to disentangle 
some of the vicious interpersonal spirals that may be wreaking their lives. The analysis 
presented here also suggests that there may be a great value for clients to working in groups, 
where they can learn about the ways in which they are perceived by others, and the accuracy 
of their metaperceptual expectations.  
 This analysis also has important implications for the practice, training and supervision 
of therapists. Therapists, like other human beings, are likely to make numerous misjudgments 
about how other people perceive them, and significant disjunctions between a therapist’s 
metaperceptions and the actual perceptions of a client might seriously undermine the quality 
of a therapeutic relationship. As an example, some years ago, not long after I had qualified as 
a practitioner, a female clinical psychologist was referred to me for counseling. I was 
somewhat daunted by the prospect, feeling relatively inexperienced, but, by the end of the 
first session, felt that I had begun to experience some feelings of warmth and empathy 
towards her, and simply assumed that she had, in some way, perceived these core conditions 
in me. At the beginning of the second session, then, I was shocked when she presented me 
with a picture she had drawn of me earlier in the week, in which I was depicted as a cold, 
aloof and unwelcoming figure, dressed entirely in black. Seeing this picture offered me an 
opportunity to share with the client how I actually experienced her, gave us an opportunity to 
explore the client’s expectations of how I might be (she had experienced a relatively 
indifferent reaction from other professionals), and also prompted me to express my feelings 
more explicitly towards this, and other, clients. Had I not been offered an opportunity to 
revise my metaperception, and consequently my behavior, towards this client, however, I 
imagine that the outcome of the therapeutic work could have been very different. 
 In terms of therapeutic practice, then, it would seem essential that both trainees and 
qualified therapists develop an awareness of how they are perceived by others: whether 
through direct interpersonal feedback in dyads, small groups, large groups, supervision and 
therapy; or through such techniques as Laing’s (1966) Interpersonal Perception Method, in 
which two people rate their agreement or disagreement towards 60 statements about self, 
other, and how other perceives self, such that levels of correspondence between one person’s 
metaperceptions and another person’s perceptions can be calculated. To the extent, however, 
that such methods lead trainees or practitioners to assume that they are viewed by others in a 
particular way, these approaches may actually be counter-productive. Instead, perhaps the 
most important thing for trainees and practitioners to acquire is an openness to the vast 
diversity of ways in which they may be seen by others. Here, perhaps, psychodynamic 
trainees and practitioners have a head-start, for an emphasis on transferential processes leads 
them to expect to be viewed by clients in a heterogeny of ways. The challenge for person-
centered and experiential trainees and therapists, then, is to find a way of being open to being 
perceived by clients in a plurality of ways, whilst at the same time not entirely extracting 
themselves from the interpersonal relationship. For trainees and practitioners, it may also be 
very important to remember that their experiential field is often much less transparent to 
clients than they assume, and that if there is some aspect of their experiential field that they 
want clients to know about, this often needs to be communicated explicitly.  
 The analysis presented in this paper, however, also suggests that the disentanglement 
of inter-experiential knots may require change at a level beyond the dyadic. If a primary 
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source of feelings of inadequacy, anxiety and isolation is the tendency for human beings to 
mask their weaknesses to each other, then the creation of a culture in which it is more 
acceptable to be vulnerable may be the most important step towards a more psychologically 
healthy world. How therapists and others might achieve this is beyond the scope of this 
paper, though recent developments in the field of emotional literacy (e.g. Weare, 2004) 
suggest some notable possibilities. 
 
DISCUSSION 
In terms of therapeutic practice, it seems likely that many of the strategies outlined 
here are already integral to the practice of numerous person-centered and experiential 
therapists. What this paper has attempted to do, however, is to formulate these practices more 
explicitly, and to ground them in a well-established body of psychological research and 
theory. To some extent, however, the present analysis also suggests something of a move 
away from a more ‘classical,’ nondirective approach to client-centered therapy (e.g. Merry, 
2004), in that it proposes that there may be a particular value in the therapist helping his or 
her client to focus on his or her interpersonal perceptions and metaperceptions. Theoretically, 
too, the analysis presented in this paper is something of a move away from a classical client-
centered model of human being, for it suggests that human beings, albeit actualizing, are not 
exempt from making certain errors in their socio-cognitive perceptions; and that these 
internal factors, as well as environmental factors, can be the source of much psychological 
distress.  
In terms of practice, then, what is being proposed here is something that comes closer, at 
times, to a more process-guiding way of working. Yet there are also differences between the 
approach outlined here and the more intrapersonally-oriented process-experiential approach 
of Greenberg, Elliott and others (e.g. Greenberg, Rice and Elliott, 1993; Elliott, Watson, 
Goldman & Greenberg, 2004), with its emphasis on helping clients explore and reconstruct 
maladaptive emotional schemes. Therapeutically, then, the strategies outlined in this paper 
might be thought of as an attempt to develop interpersonal process guiding elements within 
person-centered and experiential practice. Indeed, in process-experiential terms, one might 
think of some of the inter-perceptual problems outlined in this paper as ‘interpersonal process 
markers’ (for instance, a tendency to assume that others know what one is thinking); in 
response to which it is being suggested that therapists might propose some ‘interpersonal 
process tasks’ (for instance, exploring the client’s metaperception of the therapist and the 
therapist’s actual perceptions of the client). Given the weight of evidence in support of an 
interpersonal way of working (e.g. Elkin, et al., 1989; Markowitz, 1999), as well as in support 
of such interpersonal practices as offering feedback to clients (Claiborn, Goodyear and 
Horner, 2002), this would seem an important and timely development in this field.  
The practices outlined here are also consonant with a more dialogical, intersubjective 
approach to person-centered therapy (Mearns and Cooper, in press; Schmid, 2002), in which 
clients’ difficulties are understood primarily in relational terms, and where helping clients 
develop the capacity to relate to others in a dialogic, open and genuine manner is seen as a 
key element of the therapeutic work.  
 The approach outlined in this paper also develops some important bridges between 
person-centered and experiential therapies and a range of other therapeutic practices, many of 
which, at their core, share the same humanistic and relational values as the person-centered 
and experiential approaches. Most obviously, as discussed earlier, is the link with the 
Interpersonal Psychotherapeutic tradition (Stuart and Robertson, 2003; Sullivan, 1953; 
Weissman et al., 2000), which holds that ‘a large part of mental disorder results from and is 
perpetuated by inadequate communication’ (Cohen, 1953, p.xii). Potential links are also 
strengthened with the worlds of systemic and family therapy which also focus on nonlinear, 
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interlocking feedback mechanisms between persons (e.g. Kaslow, Dausch and Celano, 2003). 
An inter-experiential focus within the person-centered and experiential therapies also creates 
some important bridges with a range of newly emerging ‘relational’ (DeYoung, 2003; 
Hargaden and Sills, 2002; Magnavita, 2000), ‘dialogical’ (Friedman, 1985) and feminist 
therapies (e.g. Jordan, 1991, 2000), as well as with the relational variants of a number of 
more established therapeutic modalities, such as psychoanalytic psychotherapy (Curtis and 
Hirsch, 2003; Safran and Muran, 2000; Stolorow et al., 1987), gestalt therapy (Hycner and 
Jacobs, 1995), existential therapy (Laing et al., 1966; Spinelli, 1994), cognitive therapy 
(Safran and Segal, 1996), and transactional analysis (Hargaden and Sills, 2002).  
 In terms of theory, however, the inter-experiential analysis presented in this paper also 
makes a unique contribution to these fields. For what many of the systemic or 
psychodynamic approaches lack is an in-depth understanding of how one person’s concrete 
experiences and perceptions can lead to the kinds of interpersonal entanglements and 
difficulties that these approaches posit. Rather, as proponents of such approaches themselves 
note (Safran and Muran, 2000), there is a tendency to talk in more vague and abstract – even 
mystical – terms, such as ‘cybernetics’ (Kaslow et al., 2003), ‘transference’ and ‘projective 
identification’ (Curtis and Hirsch, 2003). From its phenomenological, experiential 
background, then, the Laingian-based analysis presented here can help other relationally-
orientated practitioners link the emergence of interpersonal knots to the concrete, expressed 
lived-experiences of their clients – facilitating these therapists’ abilities to help their clients 
find ways of undoing the interpersonal ties that bind them. 
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